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and help create possibilities for ambitious re-regulation of living conditions in the direction 
of, say, radical equality, participation, and redistribution.
J’analyse dans cet article plusieurs décisions canadiennes sur le transfert des droits 
syndicaux établissant les modalités selon lesquelles les droits des travailleurs peuvent 
être transférés à une entité successeure dans le contexte d’une vente d’entreprise, d’une 
restructuration ou d’une sous-traitance. Ce faisant, je mets en doute une influente théorie 
d’interprétation juridique que je nomme la « juridicité traditionnelle ». Selon cette théorie, 
le droit du travail ne procède pas d’un raisonnement juridique conventionnel, mais de 
l’application non juridique, pragmatique et téléologique de larges normes de relations 
industrielles. Je soutiens que le paradigme de la juridicité traditionnelle est analytiquement 
inexact et a l’effet pervers de légitimer le statu quo du régime de droit du travail d’après-
guerre dans un contexte où son insuffisance est largement reconnue.
Pour remplacer la juridicité traditionnelle, je propose une nouvelle approche à l’étude 
et à l’enseignement du droit du travail, que j’applique ici au droit relatif au transfert des 
droits syndicaux. Cette approche dépeint le raisonnement juridique en droit du travail non 
pas comme pragmatique et téléologique, mais comme déchiré par des conflits de politique 
juridique récurrents et incommensurables qui rendent inconcluante l’argumentation 
téléologique. Je suggère qu’en ramenant sans cesse ces conflits au premier plan de leur 
recherche et de leur enseignement, les chercheurs et professeurs de droit du travail peuvent 
contribuer à contester le statu quo et tracer la voie vers une ambitieuse réglementation des 
conditions de vie allant dans le sens, par exemple, d’une égalité, d’une participation et d’une 
redistribution radicales.
IT IS BY NOW WELL-KNOWN that economic, social, and political shifts in the last 
forty years have shaken labour and employment law to its foundations in North 
Atlantic countries. Changing trade and investment flows leading to greater market 
volatility, increased technological innovation, demographic transformations, 
increased migration flows, and the declining regulatory capacity of the nation 
state are all part of these shifts. Whether perceived or real, these changes are 
said to have rendered post-war collective bargaining and employment standards 
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legislation much less effective.1 Moreover, in this so-called “new economy,” it 
is said that “corporations have undergone a process of vertical disintegration, 
morphing into networks of firms and contractors whose constituent parts 
change as frequently as do the workers that they employ.”2 This “fissuring” of 
the traditional workplace—the workplace associated with the Fordist post-war 
economy—has had a tremendous impact on the United States and Canada’s 
Wagner Act collective labour relations model, which is based on local, single 
employer certification.3
Legislative provisions empowering labour adjudicators to protect union 
successor rights, which deal with cases where the integrity of bargaining rights is 
allegedly compromised by economic transfers and reorganizations, are of central 
legal and political importance in this context.4 Successor rights provisions are 
specifically intended to empower labour boards to preserve bargaining rights and 
the ability to associate, bargain collectively, and strike in the face of economic 
reorganizations and employer attempts to undermine bargaining structures. 
Under such provisions, labour adjudicators can transfer union certifications and 
collective agreements to new “successor” entities such as a subcontractor that 
1. See generally Richard Freeman, “The Great Doubling: The Challenge of the Growing 
Globalization of Labor Markets to Economic and Social Policy” in Eva A Paus, ed, Global 
Capitalism Unbound: Winners and Losers from Offshore Outsourcing (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007) 23; Katherine Stone, “Flexibilization, Globalization and Privatization: 
Three Challenges to Labour Rights in Our Time” (2006) 44:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 77. See 
Marie-Laure Morin, “Labour Law and New Forms of Corporate Organization” (2005) 144:1 
Intl Lab Rev 5 at 7-13; Patrick Macklem, “Labour Law Beyond Borders” (2002) 5 J Intl 
Econ L 605 at 605-7; David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the 
Origins of Cultural Change (Cambridge, Mass: Blackwell, 1989) at 159.
2. Kerry Rittich, “Transnationalizing the Values of American Labor Law” (2009) 57:3 Buff L 
Rev 803 at 808.
3. See David Weil, The Fissured Workplace: Why Work Became So Bad for So Many and What 
Can Be Done to Improve It (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2014) at 185; Jake 
Rosenfeld, What Unions No Longer Do (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2014) at 
18-19; Katherine VW Stone, From Widgets to Digits: Employment Regulation for the Changing 
Workplace (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004) at 206-208.
4. For testaments to the importance of successor rights for the shape (and very possibility) of 
collective bargaining in the new economy, see Eric Tucker, “Great Expectations Defeated: 
The Trajectory of Collective Bargaining Regimes in Canada and the United States 
Post-NAFTA” (2004) 26:1 Comp Lab L & Pol’y J 97 at 124-25; Philip M Schreiber, 
“Potential Liability of New Employers to Pre-Existing Collective Bargaining Agreements and 
Pre-Existing Unions: A Comparison of Labor Law Successorship Doctrines in the United 
States and Canada” (1992) 12:3 Nw J Intl L & Bus 571; Joseph B Rose & Gary N Chaison, 
“Unionism in Canada and the United States in the 21st Century: The Prospects for Revival” 
(2001) 56:1 Relations Industrielles 34 at 40-41.
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takes up part of a unionized business following privatization or reorganization. 
Labour adjudicators are often faced with complex economic arrangements and 
restructurings, to which they must apply broad criteria such as “continuity of 
the business” in order to make adjudicative choices (i.e., under what conditions 
to transfer certifications and collective agreements) that will determine the very 
structure of bargaining rights and in turn of the economy. European Union (EU) 
labour law deals with very similar problems through the so-called Acquired Rights 
Directive,5 which purports to maintain collective agreement and contractual 
rights in cases of business sales and reorganizations.6
This article presents an analysis of legal argument in classic Canadian successor 
rights cases dealing with the definition of the business changes that warrant the 
transfer of bargaining rights. It uses unconventional analytical methods to uncover 
patterns of “policy” argument that recur across various successor rights cases and 
could be used again in future cases dealing with different issues. In so doing, 
it maps the interconnectedness of present and future successorship cases with the 
hope of making this area of the law more comprehensible and easier to navigate. 
This is my sales pitch to labour law practitioners who are confronted with such 
cases. But this article is also intended as a broader intervention on legal thought 
in labour and employment law, as well as an example of a new approach to 
teaching and studying labour law doctrine.
Harry Arthurs, a leading Canadian labour law academic, has argued that the 
rise of the new economy described above has been accompanied by the rise of 
a “new legality,”7 whereby labour law decision making has shifted from a model 
of ad hoc “problem solving” “in which results were measured by their positive 
industrial relations consequences to one in which they are measured by their 
conformity to the established jurisprudence.”8 He asserts that this new legality 
offers opportunities for employers to compromise the efficient pragmatism 
of specialized labour law decision making by rendering it adversarial and 
5. Council Directive 77/187/EEC of 14 February 1977 on the approximation of the laws of 
the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of 
undertakings, businesses or parts of businesses, [1977] OJ, L61/26, now replaced by Directive 
2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating 
to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts 
of undertakings or businesses, [2001] OJ, L82/16.
6. See John Armour & Simon Deakin, “Insolvency and employment protection: the mixed 
effects of the Acquired Rights Directive” (2003) 22:4 Intl Rev L & Econ 443 at 444, 451.
7. “The New Economy and the New Legality: Industrial Citizenship and the Future of Labour 
Arbitration” (1999) 7:1 Can Labour & Employment LJ 46.
8. Ibid at 55.
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legalistic.9 Arthurs’s argument is symptomatic of an intellectual trend I want to 
analyze and criticize.
Arthurs’s depiction of traditional and established labour law reasoning is a 
remarkably persistent intellectual approach that lies at the heart of the post-war 
labour and employment legal regimes. This approach has an often-explicit legal 
theory, the central tenet of which is that labour and employment law is distinct 
from ‘normal’ legal reasoning in, say, private law in at least two ways: First, it is based 
on non-legal, pragmatic and ad-hoc responses by experts to social realities; and 
second, it is fundamentally based on purposive legal interpretation in light of the 
telos of achieving industrial peace, advancing the public interest, and redressing 
unequal bargaining power to maintain social stability. I will call this twofold legal 
theory the “old legality,” by playful reference to Arthurs’ terminology, although 
there are several other established terms I could have used.10 This approach or 
9. Ibid at 57. While Arthurs was talking about labour arbitrators specifically (his article is based 
on remarks at an annual labour arbitration conference), he expressed his diagnosis in terms 
touching on labour law administrative decision-making more generally.
10. Some have called this paradigm “social legal thought,” “social conceptualism,” and 
“functionalism.” See respectively Duncan Kennedy, “Three Globalizations of Law and 
Legal Thought: 1850-2000” in David M Trubek & Alvaro Santos, eds, The New Law and 
Economic Development: A Critical Appraisal (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 
19 at 41 [Kennedy, “Three Globalizations”]; Karl E Klare, “Judicial Deradicalization of 
the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941” (1978) 
62:3 Minn L Rev 265 at 278, 309 [Klare]; Kerry Rittich, “Functionalism and Formalism: 
Their Latest Incarnations in Contemporary Development and Governance Debates” 
(2005) 55:3 UTLJ 853.
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paradigm can be found in Canadian scholarship and treatises,11 case law12 and 
11. See George W Adams, Canadian Labour Law (Toronto: Thompson Reuters, 2016) at 4.30 
(labour relations boards use their superior expertise and consider the “policy facts” in order 
to make rulings in light of the purpose of “intelligent regulation” of industrial relations); 
Wesley B Rayner, Canadian Collective Bargaining Law, 2d ed (Markham: Lexis Nexis 
Canada, 2007) at 84 (labour boards’ legal reasoning as more “discretionary,” “regulatory,” and 
“general” than that of courts because of the purpose of setting “ground rules” for industrial 
relations); Donald D Carter et al, Labour Law in Canada, 5th ed (New York: Kluwer Law 
International, 2002) at 151 (describing the “web of rules” comprising “informal practices, 
customs and understandings” in the workplace as a “source” of labour law); Fernand 
Morin et al, Le droit de l’emploi au Québec, 4th ed (Montréal: Wilson & Lafleur, 2010) at 
134, 148, 166 (labour and employment law as “pragmatic,” “teleological,” distinct from 
the “strict and hard application of liberal law,” and “incessantly evolving”); Michel Coutu 
and Georges Marceau, Droit administratif du travail: tribunaux et organismes spécialisés du 
domaine du travail (Montréal: Yvon Blais, 2007) at para 2 (labour law as an “autonomous 
social law” in which “collective rights” are paramount and as a “non-formal” and “flexible” 
form of administrative justice); Paul Weiler, “The Role of the Labour Arbitrator: Alternative 
Versions” (1969) 19:1 UTLJ 16 at 16-17 (labour arbitrators have “expertise and experience” 
in “peculiar ‘non-legal’ criteria, in particular the maintenance of peaceful, uninterrupted and 
fair industrial enterprise” and do legal interpretation based on “overriding labour relations 
goals…in the interests of the public”); David Beatty, “The Role of the Arbitrator: A Liberal 
Version” (1984) 34:2 UTLJ 136 at 148 (the role of the arbitrator is that of “discovering and 
‘working pure’ th[e] industrial, common law of the shop” which includes “sound industrial 
relations standards”); Harry Arthurs, “Labour Law Without the State?” (1996) 46:1 UTLJ 
1 at 3 (labour law is about the “indigenous production and enforcement of norms within 
the workplace,” including customs and “scientific” management practices, as distinct 
from state law).
12. This intellectual framework has often been mobilized to justify curial deference to labour 
adjudicators including arbitrators and labour boards. MAHCP v Nor-Man Regional Health 
Authority Inc, 2011 SCC 59, [2011] 3 SCR 616 (Fish J, establishing that labour arbitrators 
“are not legally bound to apply equitable and common law principles … in the same manner 
as courts of law” because “theirs is a different mission, informed by the particular context of 
labour relations” at para 5. Arbitrators “may properly develop doctrines and fashion remedies 
appropriate in their field, drawing inspiration from general legal principles, the objectives 
and purposes of the statutory scheme, the principles of labour relations, the nature of the 
collective bargaining process, and the factual matrix of the grievances of which they are 
seized” at para 45. This was said to stem from the arbitrators’ “distinctive role in fostering 
peace in industrial relations” at para 47); Toronto (City of ) Board of Education v OSSTF, 
District 15, [1997] 1 SCR 487, 144 DLR (4th) 385 (Cory J, emphasizing the need for curial 
deference towards arbitrators, who are better equipped to render decisions that are “sensitive 
to the situation” of labour relations and to take account of the “basic requirement for peace 
in industrial relations” at paras 35-36); Ivanhoe Inc v UFCW, Local 500, 2001 SCC 47, 
[2001] 2 SCR 565 [Ivanhoe] (Arbour J, justifying deference to labour boards on successor 
rights issues on the basis that their members have “developed special expertise in this regard 
which is adapted to the specific context of labour relations and which is not shared by the 
courts,” allowing them to further the purpose of “promot[ing] collective bargaining as a 
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even legislation.13 It mostly relates to collective bargaining, the core of the 
post-war regime of labour and employment law.14 It is applied in equal measure 
to that regime’s two central decision makers, grievance arbitrators and labour 
boards, and it is sometimes also put forward as a mode of legal reasoning that 
the judiciary should embrace and defer to when it rules on labour law matters.15 
The old legality paradigm is often iterated by courts and scholars dealing 
with successor rights and the broad legal criteria that govern them.16 It seems 
clear that this intellectual pattern can be found at least in Canada, the United 
better means of guaranteeing industrial peace and of establishing equitable relations between 
employer and employees” at para 26); United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 503 v Wal 
Mart Canada Corp, 2014 SCC 45, [2014] 2 SCR 323 (LeBel J, justifying curial deference to 
labour arbitrators on grievances for shop closures on the basis of their “expert knowledge and 
the fact that they are specialists in such matters” at para 88).
13. Pursuant to section 121 of Manitoba’s Labour Relations Act, for example, arbitrators are free 
to consider “the real substance of the matter in dispute between the parties” and are “not 
bound by a strict legal interpretation of the matter in dispute.” See Labour Relations Act, 
RSM 1987, c L10. A quasi-identical provision can be found at section 82(2) of the British 
Columbia Labour Relations Code. See Labour Relations Code, RSBC 1996, c 244. As for the 
purposive interpretation component of the old legality, the preamble of the Canada Labour 
Code once spoke of the “promotion of the common well-being through the encouragement 
of free collective bargaining.” See Canada Labour Code, RSC 1970, c L-1, quoted in Health 
Services and Support-Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn v British Columbia, 2007 SCC 27 at 
para 65, [2007] 2 SCR 391.
14. That said, some traces of it can be found regarding collective bargaining’s more marginal 
cousin, individual employment standards statutes. See e.g. Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the 
Construction of Statutes, 5th ed (Markham, Ont: Lexis Nexis Canada, 2008) at 486-90 
(establishing “social welfare legislation” as a distinct category of laws subject to broad 
purposive interpretation and not to the principles applicable to other types of legislation).
15. See supra note 12.
16. See e.g. Adams, supra note 11; Ivanhoe, supra note 12; UES, local 298 v Bibeault, [1988] 2 
SCR 1048, 13 ACWS (3d) 23 [Bibeault].
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Kingdom, and the United States.17 It may even be found across the industrialized 
North Atlantic.18
In this article I propose a new approach to teaching and studying labour 
law doctrine that suggests that the old legality paradigm is not an accurate 
description of how labour and employment law works in practice. Taking a series 
of classic union successor rights decisions from Canada as a case study, I argue 
that labour law is made not through pragmatic, non-legal, and case-by-case 
purposive analysis, but rather proceeds as an endless chain of conventionally 
legal questions on which decision makers deploy policy argument to justify legal 
holdings.19 Thus, rather than the application of a single purpose to the factual 
matrix, the adjudicators and courts justify their holdings through contradictory 
policy arguments (including diverging purposes) that reveal deep normative 
conflict and contingency in the structure of labour law. To illustrate this 
argument, I use analytical methods created by American legal realists and critical 
legal studies. These include the technique of pairing contradictory arguments 
on a given question, and “nesting,” whereby several distinct legal questions are 
reframed as an infinite chain of related, ever-narrower sub-questions on which 
17. On the United States, see Samuel Estreicher & Matthew T Bodie, Labour Law (St Paul, 
Minn: Foundation Press, 2016) at 56-57; Alvin L Goldman & Roberto L Corrada, Labour 
Law in the USA, 3d ed (Alphen aan den Rijn, Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 
2011) at 78, 433; Michael C Harper, Samuel Estreicher & Kati Griffith, Labor Law: 
Cases, Materials, and Problems, 8th ed (New York: Wolters Kluwer, 2015) at 649-50, 658; 
Roger I Abrams, Inside Arbitration: How an Arbitrator Decides Labor and Employment Cases 
(Arlington, VA: Bloomberg BNA, 2013) at 8, 10, 32; Frank Elkouri & Edna Asper Elkouri, 
How Arbitration Works, 7th ed (Chicago: American Bar Association, 2012) at 1-1 to 1-3. 
On the United Kingdom, see Hugh Collins, KD Ewing & Aileen McColgan, Labour Law 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012) at 34; Anne CL Davies, Perspectives on 
Labour Law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004) at 3.
18. I am less confident about this. For analyses on France, see Antoine Mazeaud, Droit du 
travail, 2d ed (Paris: Monchrestien, 2000) at 14-15; Christophe Radé, Droit du travail et 
responsabilité civile (Paris: LGDJ, 1997) at 3-5. On Germany, see the materials cited in Roger 
Blanpain et al, The Global Workplace. International and Comparative Employment Law: Cases 
and Materials (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 409. For analyses positing 
my “old legality” as symptomatic of transnational trends in legal thought, including in labour 
law, see Justin Desautels-Stein, “Pragmatic Liberalism: The Outlook of the Dead” (2014) 
55:4 BCL Rev 1041 at 1069; Kennedy, “Three Globalizations,” supra note 10 at 41.
19. I will use the term “decision makers” to designate any and all bodies or persons adjudicating 
labour law matters, including labour boards, arbitrators, and courts. I will make it clear 
when I wish to refer only to administrative (as opposed to judicial) adjudicators, or only to a 
subset of those.
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the same arguments can be applied recurrently.20 Finally, I rely on theories of 
legal indeterminacy21 to emphasize what Max Weber called the “conflict of the 
gods”:22 intractable conflict between incommensurable values and norms, which 
manifest themselves here as policy arguments in favour of broader or narrower 
rules governing union successor rights.
There are several reasons why one would be interested in such an analysis. 
The first is analytical accuracy; I claim that my model of conflicting and 
incommensurable policy arguments is a better description of actual labour law 
reasoning than the old legality paradigm. Practitioners and legal theorists should 
be interested in this. The second impetus behind such a démarche is political. 
Seeing the post-war labour and employment law regime as animated by a 
coherent, purposive, and non-legal logic potentially has normative consequences 
for the scope of law reform projects we think are possible and desirable. The 
displacement of the post-war regime by a purported neoliberal deregulatory 
agenda may tempt labour lawyers to merely brandish the old legality flag of 
non-legal pragmatism, as opposed to advocating more profound legal changes 
both within and beyond the labour law regime in the direction of, say, radical 
equality, participation, and redistribution. In other words, as Karl Klare famously 
argued in his critique of the post-war labour model’s “social conceptualism,” the 
old legality might reinforce the status quo.23 Underlining the deep normative 
conflicts inside the pragmatic and purposive fortress might lead us to see the 
structure of the economy as much more open to contestation and redesigning. 
This article is thus based on the assumption that labour law doctrine matters a 
great deal politically. It is meant to counter a certain neglect of doctrine (and 
20. See e.g. Karl Llewellyn, “Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or 
Canons about How Statutes Are to Be Construed” (1950) 3:3 Vand L Rev 395 [Llewellyn]; 
Duncan Kennedy, “Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication” (1976) 89:8 Harv 
L Rev 1685 at 1723-24; Duncan Kennedy, “A Semiotics of Legal Argument” in Collected 
Courses of the Academy of European Law 3:2 (1994) 309 at 344, 346 [Kennedy, “Semiotics”]. 
See also Jack Balkin, “The Crystalline Structure of Legal Thought” (1986) 39:1 Rutgers L 
Rev 1 at 5 [Balkin].
21. See infra notes 133-135 and accompanying text.
22. “Science as a Vocation” in David Owen & Tracy B. Strong, eds, The Vocation Lectures: 
“Science as a Vocation”, “Politics as a Vocation” (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 2004) at 27.
23. Klare, supra note 10.
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critical analysis thereof ) in favour of institutional mechanisms and enforcement 
in contemporary labour law scholarship.24
The post-war purposes of redressing unequal bargaining power in order to 
attain stability and industrial peace have been criticized by sophisticated labour 
law theorists, who have proposed alternatives ranging from human rights25 
(or capabilities theory26) to economic efficiency.27 But there has never been, 
to my knowledge, a sustained internal critique of the old legality’s theory of 
24. See e.g. Mark Anner, Jennifer Bair & Jeremy Blasi, “Toward Joint Liability in Global Supply 
Chains: Addressing the Root Causes of Labor Violations in International Subcontracting 
Networks” (2013) 35:1 Comp Lab L & Pol’y J 1; Cynthia Estlund, “Rebuilding the Law 
of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation” in Brian Bercusson & Cynthia Estlund, eds, 
Regulating Labour in the Wake of Globalisation: New Challenges, New Institutions (Portland: 
Hart Publishing, 2008) 89 at 112; Lance Compa, “From Chile to Vietnam: International 
Labour Law and Workers’ Rights in International Trade” in Gráinne de Búrca, Claire 
Kilpatrick & Joanne Scott, eds, Critical Legal Perspectives on Global Governance: Liber 
Amicorum David M Trubek (Portland: Hart Publishing 2013) 143 [de Búrca, Kilpatrick & 
Scott]; Bob Hepple, Labour Laws and Global Trade (Portland: Hart Publishing, 2005) at 
151-92; Alain Supiot, “Governing Work and Welfare in a Global Economy” in Jonathan 
Zeitlin & David M Trubek, eds, Governing Work and Welfare in a New Economy: European 
and American Experiments (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003) 376 at 382-87; 
Virginia A Leary, “The Paradox of Workers’ Rights as Human Rights” in Lance A Compa 
& Stephen F Diamond, eds, Human Rights, Labour Rights, and International Trade 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996) 22 at 39-43.
25. See Bob Hepple, “Equality and Empowerment for Decent Work” (2001) 140:1 Int’l Lab Rev 
5 at 9; Nicolas Valticos, “International Labour Standards and Human Rights: Approaching 
the Year 2000” (1998) 137:2 Int’l Lab Rev 135 at 138; Deirdre McCann, “Decent Working 
Hours as a Human Right: Intersections in the Regulation of Working Time” in Tonia Novitz 
& Colin Fenwick, eds, Human Rights at Work: Perspectives on Law and Regulation (Portland: 
Hart Publishing, 2010) 509 at 514.
26. See Amartya Sen, “Work and Rights” (2000) 139:2 Int’l Lab Rev 82, republished as a “special 
supplement” in vol 152 (2013); Brian Langille, “Imagining Post Geneva Consensus Labour 
Law for Post Washington Consensus Development” (2010) 31:3 Comp Lab L & Pol’y J 
523 at 525; Tonia Novitz & Colin Fenwick, Introduction: The Application of Human Rights 
Discourse to Labour Relations: Translation of Theory into Practice, in Novitz & Fenwick, supra 
note 26 at 37; Jude Browne, Simon Deakin & Frank Wilkinson, “Capabilities, Social Rights 
and European Market Integration” in Robert Salais & Rovert De Villeneuve, eds, Europe and 
the Politics of Capabilities (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 205.
27. See Alan Hyde, “The International Labor Organization in the Stag Hunt for Global Labor 
Rights” (2009) 3:2 L & Ethics Human Rights 154 at 163; Christopher McCrudden & 
Anne Davies, “A Perspective on Trade and Labour Rights” (2000) 3:1 J Int’l Econ L 43 at 
51-52; Michael Trebilcock, “Trade Policy and Labour Standards: Objectives, Instruments and 
Institutions” in John Kirton & Michael Trebilcock, eds, Hard Choices, Soft Law (Burlington, 
Vt: Ashgate, 2004) 170 at 173-74; David Charny, “Regulatory Competition and the Global 
Coordination of Labor Standards” (2000) 3:2 J Int’l Econ L 281 at 300.
MCDOUGALL,  CANADIAN UNION SUCCESSOR RIGHTS LAW 263
legal reasoning akin to that performed on deductive private law reasoning by 
anti-formalist scholars of all stripes.28 These include the American legal realists 
and their use of the category “policy” to emphasize the political contestability of 
nineteenth-century laissez-faire legal approaches.29 This is the kind of scholarly 
agenda I exemplify here using Canadian union successor rights adjudication as a 
case study. I chose successor rights adjudication because of its centrality to the old 
legality paradigm: Protection of bargaining rights is at the core of the perceived 
mandate of pragmatic and purposive labour decision makers, in this case labour 
boards.30 I also chose successor rights because of their central political importance 
in the context of the disintegration of the North American labour law model in 
the face of changing business structures. As I will explain below, I could have 
illustrated my proposed approach using other topics of labour law. Confronted 
with a choice, I decided that union successor rights would be analytically and 
politically rewarding.
The article proceeds as follows. Parts I and II briefly summarize some of 
the classic successor rights cases from Ontario and Quebec whereby labour 
boards and courts have adopted and applied the test to determine whether there 
was a transfer of a business so as to trigger the application of successor rights 
provisions. I focus on the adoption of what the case law calls the “instrumental” 
approach to the question of how to define the business—that is, what degree 
of organizational continuity is required for bargaining rights to be transferred 
(a question that is also central to US union successorship law and EU acquired 
rights law).31 According to the instrumental approach, which replaced more 
union-friendly legal tests that transmitted bargaining rights when jobs were 
moved to a new employer, bargaining rights will not be transmitted merely when 
jobs are reassigned, but only when all key components of the business pass to the 
alleged successor employer. Four of the cases I analyze deal with subcontracting 
arrangements stemming from business reorganizations, and two deal with sales 
28. The exception could be Klare, supra note 10.
29. See e.g. Wesley N Hohfeld, “Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied to Judicial 
Reasoning” (1913) 23:1 Yale LJ 16 at 36; Morris Cohen, “The Basis of Contract” (1933) 
46:4 Harv L Rev 553 at 562; Robert Hale, “Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty” 
(1943) 43:5 Colum L Rev 603 at 628.
30. Though this introduction refers to both grievance arbitrators and labour boards, 
my case study only deals with the latter as in Canada arbitrators do not deal with union 
successorship questions.
31. See Schreiber, supra note 4 at 576-80; Vivien Shrubsall, “Competitive Tendering, 
Out-sourcing and the Acquired Rights Directive” (1998) 61:1 Mod L Rev 85 at 
89-91 [Shrubsall].
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of assets following bankruptcy. Part III argues that, despite factual differences, 
these cases are best analyzed as interlocking legal questions answered by tribunals 
and courts as they work out the implications of the instrumental approach to 
the definition of the business. In this Part, I argue that decision makers have not 
merely applied the instrumental approach to new factual contexts but have had 
to make legal findings that were not dictated by that legal test. I read the cases 
from Ontario and Quebec together as a pyramid of (nested) sub-questions of law 
stemming from the adoption of the instrumental approach. I thereby underline 
the interconnectedness of holdings made under that test. This goes to the first 
trait of the old legality, i.e., the idea that labour law adjudication can be ad-hoc, 
non-legal, and context specific. Even though successor rights decisions often 
present themselves this way, I demonstrate that they are in fact interconnected legal 
holdings that build the cumulative framework applicable to successorship claims. 
In Part IV, I present the policy arguments that adjudicators have used to justify 
their decisions. I present summative tables of policy arguments drawn from all the 
cases covered in order to show that the legal questions from the cases are closely 
related. With a view to emphasizing that the arguments from the various cases 
can be intermingled, I present them in pairs, drawing on different cases (dealing 
with different questions) for each argument. The idea here is to demonstrate that 
the policies can be invoked under any of the nested sub-questions. In assembling 
this repertoire of contradictory policy arguments, I also address the second 
component of the old legality—i.e., the purported supremacy of purposive or 
teleological reasoning. What I mean to convey here is that purposive argument 
is seldom determinative, and that other policy arguments often supplement, 
counterbalance or set aside purposive arguments. I suggest that this reveals deep 
and incommensurable normative conflicts inside labour law.
I do not claim that my case study of a series of decisions is representative, 
either of labour law as a whole or even of all the successor rights cases out there. 
In fact, I do not think it is possible to assemble a set of cases from which one 
can generalize to a whole field of law on a strictly empirical basis. The analysis 
I propose here can thus be seen as a very preliminary illustration of a new kind 
of engagement with labour law doctrine, one that views it less as a purposive 
and pragmatic form of social engineering and more as a congealed political 
compromise that rests on unresolvable normative conflicts. It is meant to suggest 
that, by extending the model proposed here to other labour law questions and 
continuously bringing labour law’s normative conflicts to the fore through 
teaching and research, labour law scholars can open up the status quo for 
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normative contestation and gather momentum to redraw the legal system along 
more egalitarian lines.
I. ONTARIO SUCCESSOR RIGHTS CASES: FROM METRO-
PARKING TO AJAX
In this part and the next, I summarize the cases I will use in my analysis of legal 
argument. These parts get into the lawyerly details of the cases and offer little 
theorizing. The reasons for this will become apparent as I flesh out my theoretical 
assumptions below. Suffice it to say for now that I think the best way to refute 
the old legality and to validate my model of intractable normative conflict is 
to be relentlessly concrete and to study actual argumentative practices as they 
play out in cases. This approach is based both on a practical and applied view of 
legal indeterminacy and on a taste for finding broader political significance in 
the technicalities of everyday legal reasoning. That is why this article takes the 
form of a concrete case study as opposed to a jurisprudential exposition. I hope 
the reader will bear with the detailed presentations in Parts I and II and I trust 
subsequent parts will make this somewhat dry read rewarding as they build an 
overarching critical analytical framework out of this primary material.
This part summarizes a few leading Ontario successor rights cases that I 
will use in my analysis of legal argument. These cases deal with the meaning of 
“sale of business” (defined very broadly as “includ[ing] leases, transfers and any 
other manner of disposition”),32 the prerequisite for a finding of successorship 
under the Ontario successor rights provision, section 69 of the Labour Relations 
Act.33 I start with the foundational Metro-Parking case, in which the Ontario 
Labour Relations Board (OLRB) established the “instrumental approach” to the 
definition of business.34 According to that legal test, the transfer of a business 
32. Labour Relations Act, 1995, SO 1995, c 1, Schedule A, s 69(1).
33. Section 69(2), the core provision, reads as follows:
Where an employer who is bound by or is a party to a collective agreement with a trade union 
or council of trade unions sells his, her or its business, the person to whom the business has 
been sold is, until the Board otherwise declares, bound by the collective agreement as if the 
person had been a party thereto and, where an employer sells his, her or its business while an 
application for certification or termination of bargaining rights to which the employer is a 
party is before the Board, the person to whom the business has been sold is, until the Board 
otherwise declares, the employer for the purposes of the application as if the person were 
named as the employer in the application (ibid).
34. Canadian Union of Public Employees v Metropolitan Parking Inc, [1980] 1 CLRBR 197, 
[1979] OLRB Rep 1193 [Metro-Parking].
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must involve the organically central elements of the economic activity in 
question, and mere similarity of the work done by the previous business and 
the alleged successor cannot suffice. The adoption of the instrumental approach 
entailed rejection of a more expansive test, the “functional approach,” according 
to which bargaining rights can be transferred when mere jobs (or “functions”) 
are moved to another employer. Metro-Parking’s instrumental approach is similar 
to the US Supreme Court’s doctrine of “substantial continuity of identity in the 
business enterprise,”35 applicable in American union successorship law, as well 
as to the approach adopted by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) under the 
EU Acquired Rights Directive.36 After dealing with Metro-Parking, I summarize 
the OLRB’s subsequent Accomodex37 and Ajax38 decisions, which applied the 
instrumental approach to other instances of business transfers. I discuss the 
cases in chronological order to give a sense of the way in which Ontario decision 
makers have elaborated the implications of the instrumental approach adopted 
in Metro-Parking, an approach they have never since repudiated. I then examine 
Quebec successor rights cases in Part II. I will build on these summaries in Parts 
III and IV as I lay out my combined study of legal argument that spans all the 
cases and intermingles the contradictory policy arguments that they contain.
Metro-Parking, a 1979 decision, involved two federal government 
subcontractors: Metropolitan Parking Inc (Metropolitan) and Toronto Auto 
Parks Ltd (TAP). TAP was engaged in managing and operating the parking 
installations at the Toronto Pearson airport as a subcontractor to the federal 
government, which owned the airport, the parking facilities, and the assets related 
to the parking business.39 The complainant union had obtained certification for 
35. John Wiley & Sons, Inc v Livingston, 376 US 543 at 551 (1964) [Wiley].
36. In the famous Süzen case, the ECJ held that there is no transfer of part of a business “if there 
is no concomitant transfer of significant tangible or intangible assets or the taking over by 
the new employer of a major part of the workforce, in terms of their numbers and skills, 
assigned by the predecessor to the performance of the contract.” See Süzen v Zehnacker 
Gebaudereinigung GmbH and Laefarth GmbH, C-13/95, [1997] ECR I-01259 at I-01263. 
The ECJ further held that the business entity cannot be reduced to the activity entrusted to it 
but must “emerge[ ] from other factors, such as the entity’s workforce, its management staff, 
the way in which its work is organised, its operating methods … or the operational resources 
available to it” (ibid at I-01262).
37. Hotel Employees Restaurant Employees Union, Local 75 v Accomodex Franchise Management Inc, 
[1993] OLRB Rep 281, 19 CLRBR (2d) 1 [Accomodex].
38. National Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers Union of Canada 
(CAW-Canada) and its Local 222 v Charterways Transportation Ltd, The Corporation of Ajax 
(Town of ), [1994] OLRB Rep 1296, 24 CLRBR (2d) 280 [Ajax, OLRB].
39. Metro-Parking, supra note 34 at para 4.
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the employees of TAP, but had never held a certification binding the federal 
government.40 As TAP’s contract with the government expired, Metropolitan 
was chosen to replace TAP as the manager of the parking facilities in the course 
of a competitive bidding process. Metropolitan recruited a “substantial number 
of TAP’s bargaining unit employees” as well as much of TAP’s management.41 
However, there was “no corporate relationship”42 between Metropolitan and 
TAP at any time.
Against this factual background, the OLRB held that there was no “sale 
of business” as per section 69 (then 55) of the Ontario Labour Relations Act. 
In essence, the OLRB held that “there must be more than the performance of like 
functions by another business entity”43 for there to be a “sale” of business under 
the successor rights provision. As put by the OLRB:
There must be a transfer from the predecessor of the essential elements of the 
business as a block or as a “going concern.” A business is not synonymous with 
its customers or the work it performs or its employees. Rather, it is the economic 
organization which is used to attract customers or perform the work.44
This has been referred to as the instrumental definition of the business, 
as opposed to a “functional” definition which hinges on the similarity of the 
employees’ functions or work. 45 It will be apparent that the functional approach, 
which Metro-Parking rejected, is more pro-union than the instrumental approach 
that the case adopted, as it allows for more transfers of bargaining rights. 
Metro-Parking also introduced a second requirement that became central to 
ulterior case law: that of a “sale” (in the sense of an actual transfer), later referred 
to as the need for a “nexus” between the alleged successor and transferor. This is 
equivalent to the European Court of Justice’s requirement of a “contractual link” 
for transfer of acquired rights under EU labour law.46 By rejecting the argument 
that the loss of TAP’s contract and the simultaneous hiring of some of TAP’s 
employees constituted a “sale,”47 the OLRB made a very influential finding.
40. Ibid at para 2. This will become very important for subsequent discussion of the application 
of the test devised in Metro-Parking.
41. Ibid at para 14-15.
42. Ibid at para 3.
43. Ibid at para 44.
44. Ibid.
45. See e.g. Ajax (Town) v CAW, Local 222, 2000 SCC 23, [2000] 1 SCR 538, at para 9 [Ajax]; 
Bibeault, supra note 16 at para 75.
46. Shrubsall, supra note 31 at 86.
47. Metro-Parking, supra note 34 at para 45.
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In 1993, some fourteen years after Metro-Parking, the Accomodex case presented 
an occasion for the OLRB to clarify some implications of the instrumental 
approach. The question the OLRB faced in Accomodex was whether a transaction 
involving only a transfer of assets, with no significant transfer of employees (but 
with similarity of functions), should automatically be considered insufficient as 
per the instrumental approach to successor rights. A second, related question 
was whether a hiatus between the operations of alleged successive employers is 
determinative and must lead to the rejection of a successorship claim.
Accomodex involved Skyline Triumph Hotel (Triumph), which had closed 
because of financial difficulties.48 The employees of the hotel had been represented 
by a labour union. Eighteen months after the closing, Kelloryn Consulting Inc 
(Kelloryn) acquired “the lands, buildings and virtually all of the other tangible 
assets formerly used by the Triumph in its hotel operation.”49 The OLRB found 
that there was no significant continuity in the workforce, since only ten out of 
the 150 ex-employees of Triumph had been hired to work in the new hotel.50 
The OLRB, however, did note that the functions, that is, the work performed 
by the new employees, were essentially the same as those performed by the 
former employees of Triumph.51 In this context, the OLRB answered two related 
questions of law that were potentially determinative: first, whether a transfer of 
mere assets (presumably combined with similarity of functions as in Accomodex) 
can, as a matter of law, lead to a finding of successorship; and second, whether 
a hiatus between the alleged successive businesses necessarily impedes a finding 
of successorship. Before answering these questions, the OLRB reiterated that the 
applicable test was the instrumental definition of the business, i.e., a view of the 
business as an integrated whole that goes beyond mere similarity of work.52 The 
OLRB also reiterated its finding in Gordons Markets that a change of employees 
is not determinative of the successor rights claim.53 Having made these remarks, 
the OLRB found as follows:
48. Accomodex, supra note 37 at para 15.
49. Ibid at para 18.
50. Ibid at para 37.
51. Ibid at para 40.
52. Ibid at paras 54-55.
53. Ibid at para 61, citing Retail Clerks Union Local 206 v Gordons Markets a Division of Zehrmart 
Ltd, [1978] OLRB Rep 630, [1978] 2 Can LRBR 460. The Gordons Markets case involved 
a grocery store going out of business and a subsequent business taking over its lease to open 
a new grocery store on the same premises, without purchasing any inventories or equipment 
and, importantly, without hiring former employees.
MCDOUGALL,  CANADIAN UNION SUCCESSOR RIGHTS LAW 269
[W]e do not think that hiatus is conclusive where, as here, the asset configuration 
has remained substantially intact and continues (albeit with renovations) at the core 
of the “new” business organization. Our decision has the effect of affixing bargaining 
rights to an asset configuration, but in all the circumstances, we do not think that 
this is inappropriate when this “part” of the predecessor’s organization is so integral 
or essential to its operating capacity.54
Thus, a hiatus will not be determinative and a transfer of assets may suffice, 
if such assets are fundamental to the business. This adds considerable precision 
to the legal framing of the instrumental approach in Ontario as to what can 
and cannot suffice under successor rights provisions. After answering these legal 
questions, the Board turned to the case at hand and found successorship, in part 
because on the facts of the case the assets (and their location) were a fundamental 
component of the business, as they had “a relationship with its local market.”55
The OLRB dealt with another high profile successorship question in the 1994 
case of Ajax.56 In that case, the Town of Ajax was faced with a successor rights 
claim related to employees it had recently hired in an effort to reassume control 
over the operation of its transit system. The complainant union had obtained 
certification for the employees of Charterways, a private contractor that had 
operated the Ajax public transit system from its creation. The Town of Ajax had 
always been the owner of the assets related to the transit system (buses, buildings, 
payment systems, et cetera), while Charterways “provided and coordinated a 
complement of trained drivers to operate the buses, and a group of mechanics 
and cleaners to maintain and repair the fleet.”57 When Charterways’s contract 
with the Town of Ajax expired in 1992, however, the Town decided to assume 
operation of the transit system. Charterways thus terminated the employees 
formerly involved in the operation of the transit system. The Town of Ajax then 
launched a recruitment campaign, as a result of which a “substantial majority”58 
of its new employees were former employees of Charterways. The OLRB ruled 
that Ajax was the successor employer to Charterways, relying on some policy 
arguments that I will outline below, as well as some key factual findings. The 
OLRB found that Charterways’s former business “was not the provision or 
operation of a bus service,” but rather “consisted primarily of the provision of 
a skilled work force to the Town.”59 As a consequence, the OLRB held that the 
54. Ibid at para 81.
55. Ibid at para 78.
56. Ajax, OLRB, supra note 38.
57. Ibid at para 14.
58. Ibid at para 24.
59. Ibid at para 40.
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workforce taken back by Ajax was Charterways’s “most valuable asset,”60 one that 
was “essential to the continued operation of the transit system.”61 The OLRB also 
emphasized that Ajax actively solicited the employees’ applications, and that as a 
consequence it “took back more than it initially contracted out.”62
The OLRB’s decision was quashed by the Ontario Divisional Court on 
judicial review, mainly on the basis that “there was no ‘nexus’, ‘legal act’ or ‘legal 
relation’”63 between Ajax and Charterways. In other words, unilateral hiring of 
another business’s employees is not enough. On appeal, the Ontario Court of 
Appeal purported to restore the OLRB’s ruling on this point. The Court of Appeal 
found that the “nexus between Charterways and the Town is the commercial 
history without which the Town’s acquisition of the work force would not have 
occurred.”64 The Court of Appeal also agreed with the OLRB that a “business” 
had indeed been transferred through the hiring of the employees.65 The Supreme 
Court of Canada upheld the Court of Appeal’s decision, noting that the “historical 
and functional connection between Charterways and the Town of Ajax”66 was not 
an unreasonable basis for the OLRB’s finding of successorship.
II. QUEBEC SUCCESSOR RIGHTS CASES: FROM BIBEAULT 
TO IVANHOE
The two Quebec cases I analyze follow a similar pattern to those in Ontario in that 
they first forcefully affirmed an “organic” or instrumental approach to successor 
rights (in Bibeault)67 and then added some precisions (in Ivanhoe)68 as to what 
that test entails. In this part I briefly summarize the two cases before assessing the 
conceptual relationship between them and the Ontario cases in part III.
Bibeault involved three subcontractors performing janitorial work for a school 
board. Two of these subcontractors, BDM and Netco, originally had contracts 
60. Ibid at para 41.
61. Ibid at para 42.
62. Ibid.
63. CAW, Local 222 v Charterways Transportation Ltd, 95 CLLC 210-040 at para 40, 84 OAC 
281 (Ont Gen Div) [Ajax, Div Ct].
64. Ajax (Town of ) v National Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers 
Union of Canada (1998), 41 OR (3d) 426, [1998] 166 DLR (4th) 516 (CA) at para 
25 [Ajax, ONCA].
65. Ibid at paras 26-27.
66. Ajax, supra note 45 at para 2.
67. Bibeault, supra note 16.
68. Ivanhoe, supra note 12.
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with the school board, and their employees were under a union certification. 
Notably, the school board was never the employer of the janitors, who were from 
the start recruited by the subcontractors.69 After the subcontractors’ employees 
went on strike, the school board terminated the subcontracts and retained the 
services of a new subcontractor, Services Ménagers Roy Ltée (Roy). The union 
initiated proceedings under the Quebec successor rights provision (section 
45 of the Quebec Labour Code) to be declared the bargaining agent for the 
Roy employees. 70
Justice Beetz, writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, put an end to a 
division in Quebec labour law between advocates of “functional” and “organic” 
(instrumental) definitions of the “undertaking” (the business).71 The Court 
unequivocally rejected the functional definition, stressing that two entities cannot 
be successors “solely because each of them hires employees engaged in similar 
activities.”72 Instead, Justice Beetz adopted the organic definition put forward 
by Justice Lesage of the Quebec Labour Court, a definition that is strikingly 
similar to Metro-Parking’s instrumental approach (and to the ECJ’s approach in 
the aforementioned Süzen case):73
It is thus incorrect to treat the undertaking and the positions or functions listed in 
the certificate of certification as equivalent. … Instead of being reduced to a list of 
duties or functions, the undertaking covers all the means available to an employer 
to attain his objective.74
69. Bibeault, supra note 16 at para 5.
70. CQLR c C-27, ss 45. The provisions read as follows:
The alienation or operation by another in whole or in part of an undertaking shall not invalidate 
any certification granted under this Code, any collective agreement or any proceeding for the 
securing of certification or for the making or carrying out of a collective agreement.
The new employer, notwithstanding the division, amalgamation or changed legal structure 
of the undertaking, shall be bound by the certification or collective agreement as if he were 
named therein and shall become ipso facto a party to any proceeding relating thereto, in the 
place and stead of the former employer.
71. Ibid. I am using the words “business” and “sale” instead of “undertaking” and “alienation 
or operation by another,” used in the English version of section 45 of the Quebec Labour 
Code. I do so because the latter expressions strike me as clumsy translations of entreprise and 
aliénation, two French words roughly equivalent to “business” and “sale.”
72. Bibeault, supra note 16 at para 219.
73. Ibid at para 67; supra note 36.
74. Bibeault, supra note 16 at paras 173-74.
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Justice Beetz also held that one of the corollaries of the organic approach 
is the need for a direct “legal relation” between successive employers.75 This is 
roughly equivalent to the “nexus” in Ontario law and the ECJ’s “contractual 
link” requirement.76 This essentially doomed the union’s claim, which relied in 
part on the idea that the relationship between Roy and the school board created 
a legal relation with the previous subcontractors. Since the school board had 
never been the employer of the janitors, it did not transfer anything to Roy. 
Moreover, the three subcontractors had never planned any transfer of business; 
the replacement of BDM and Netco by Roy was caused by competition for 
contracts alone.77 Therefore, the Court dismissed the union’s claim and the new 
janitors were not unionized.
In 2001, the Supreme Court decided an appeal relating to the framework laid 
out in Bibeault. Ivanhoe Inc owned and managed a shopping center. It originally 
employed the mall’s janitors itself78 and later subcontracted the janitorial services 
to Moderne, which hired the same employees.79 Ivanhoe called for bids at the end 
of its contract with Moderne. Moderne did not submit a bid. Ivanhoe entered 
into contracts with four companies to replace Moderne’s janitorial services. 
Moderne’s workers from the Ivanhoe mall were all terminated and none of them 
were hired by the new contractors. The work performed by the alleged successors 
was identical to that previously performed by Moderne.80 The union that had 
represented the janitors employed first by Ivanhoe and then by Moderne filed a 
claim under the Quebec successor rights provision to be declared the bargaining 
agent of the new janitors working on the premises of the shopping center.
In Ivanhoe, the Supreme Court validated two theories or doctrines relied 
upon by the Quebec Labour Court: the “theory of retrocession” and what I 
will call the doctrine of the right to operate. These two doctrines correspond 
respectively to the two requirements of successor rights outlined in Bibeault 
(and Metro-Parking): the need for a “legal relation” (or nexus) and the need 
for a transfer of a business (defined in an organic or instrumental manner). 
On the first element, the Court accepted as reasonable the theory of retrocession, 
which had been elaborated by the Quebec Labour Court long before Bibeault.81 
According to that theory, successor rights provisions do not apply when the work 
75. Ibid at paras 185, 205.
76. Shrubsall, supra note 31.
77. Bibeault, supra note 16 at paras 216-18.
78. Ivanhoe, supra note 12 at para 3.
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid at para 6.
81. Ibid at para 83.
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of a unionized subcontractor is transferred to a second subcontractor (as was the 
case in Bibeault and, incidentally, in Metro-Parking). The theory of retrocession, 
however, allows a finding of successorship where the entity that is subcontracting 
the work was originally covered by a certification (as was the case in Ivanhoe).82 
Provided that sufficiently important elements of the business are transferred, 
the subcontracting employer is held to have passed on the business to the first 
subcontractor, taken it back and then passed it on again (“retroceded” it) to the 
second subcontractor.83 On the second element, the Court held that a “right to 
operate,” defined as the “right to perform specific duties at a specific location 
for a specific purpose,”84 could suffice to trigger successor rights provisions if it 
is combined with the “transfer of functions,”85 meaning a transfer of jobs, not 
necessarily of employees. The Court held that this definition was consistent with 
the organic approach adopted in Bibeault. It confirmed the issuance of an order 
transferring the union certification to the four subsequent subcontractors.86
82. Ibid at para 3.
83. Ibid.
84. Ibid at para 51.
85. Ibid at para 72.
86. The Quebec legislature amended the successor rights provisions as a direct reaction to the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Ivanhoe, expressly repudiating the Court’s decision by adding the 
words “in addition to functions or the right to operate.” The new art 45 of the Labour Code 
reads as follows:
The second paragraph [the successor rights provision] does not apply in the case of the transfer 
of part of the operation of an undertaking where such transfer does not entail the transfer to the 
transferee, in addition to functions or the right to operate, of most of the elements that characterize 
the part of the undertaking involved. [emphasis added] (RSQ 2003, c C-27, art 45).
 For a while it was not clear how this provision was to be interpreted by labour boards and 
courts. If the provision is taken at face value, it might forbid any finding of successorship 
in cases where a subcontractor takes up a new contract without more. The Quebec labour 
board has adopted this interpretation, which essentially rules out the Ivanhoe holding that 
bargaining rights can be transferred when a “right to operate” is transferred along with jobs 
only. See Union des employés & employées de service, local 800 c École Maïmonide - CPE, 2007 
QCCRT 69, DTE 2008T-478 at para 20. Interestingly, however, in a widely-read Quebec 
Bar casebook prepared by several partners of the (now defunct) management-side firm 
Heenan Blaikie LLP, it was still recently argued that the provision could receive another, 
“restrictive interpretation,” “requiring the transfer of characteristic elements other than work, 
if there are any.” See Geneviève Beaudin et al, Droit du travail (Cowansville, QC: Thomson 
Reuters, 2011) at 160 [emphasis added, translated by the author]. This might provide the 
seeds for another high-profile successorship battle by opening the door to an application of 
the Ivanhoe ruling in some circumstances where the work can be said to be the only element 
characterizing the business.
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III. READING THE CASES TOGETHER: QUESTIONS OF LAW 
IN PYRAMIDAL INTERCONNECTION
This part reads the cases summarized above together, setting the table for a 
broader analysis of legal argument across all cases. I argue that the instrumental 
definition of the business, adopted in both provinces, does not eliminate further 
disagreement as to the adoption of certain rules to specify the requirements of 
the test applicable to successor rights. I also relate the different issues posed by 
the successor rights cases in order to describe how the instrumental approach 
has developed since Metro-Parking and Bibeault. This will allow me to present, 
in Part IV, an overarching analysis of all the policy arguments raised in support 
of broader or narrower successorship rules, thereby illustrating my proposed 
approach of eschewing the old legality and emphasizing the unresolved legal 
conflicts that run across a given series of labour law decisions.
As we have seen, Ontario and Quebec both have foundational cases in 
which there was consensus in favour of an instrumental or organic approach to 
successor rights. However, both provinces have seen high profile labour disputes 
over what exactly the instrumental approach entails in specific cases (just as the 
ECJ has in the context of its own instrumental approach to business transfers 
under the European Acquired Rights Directive).87 I now make two claims about 
this succession of legal disputes: first, that the instrumental approach does 
not in itself provide an answer to subsequent disputes, and second, that these 
disputes are best described as questions of law whereby a rule is added to the 
instrumental approach, as opposed to a mere “application” of that approach to 
the facts of each case.
The first claim is that while the adoption of the instrumental approach was 
a turning point in the case law, it did not provide enough guidance to settle 
subsequent disputes. Thus, litigants can disagree as to whether, for example, 
a mere sale of assets should be considered a priori sufficient or not, while wholly 
agreeing that the instrumental approach to successor rights is the test that 
applies. The resolution of this disagreement is not obvious, as the instrumental 
approach is defined negatively: Successorship findings cannot be based merely on 
similarity of functions. Beyond that, the adjudicator must look for a transfer of 
the “essential elements of the business as a block or as a ‘going concern.’”88 Given 
the generality of this test, it is to be expected that subsequent questions would 
87. See Gavin Barrett, “Deploying the Classic ‘Community Method’ in the Social Policy Field: 
The Example of the Acquired Rights Directive” (2009) 15:2 Eur LJ 198 at 205.
88. Metro-Parking, supra note 34 at para 44.
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be raised as to whether certain specific factors should be a priori insufficient (as 
the similarity of functions was). Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between the 
cases summarized above:
FIGURE 1. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CASES
Functional Approach vs.  
Instrumental Approach
(Metro-Parking & Bibeault)
Is failure to hire past 
employees determinative?
(Gordons Markets)
Is a unilateral decision to hire 
past employees necessarily 
insufficient?
(Town of Ajax)
Is a transaction of assets 
after a hiatus of business 
necessarily insufficient?
(Accomodex)
Is a “retroceded” right to 
operate combined with 
similarity of work necessarily 
insufficient?
(Ivanhoe)
As can be seen from Figure 1, the cases all dealt with the question of whether or 
not a certain transferred element can suffice at all for a finding of successorship (as 
was also the case in the ECJ cases dealing with the Acquired Rights Directive).89 
For instance, the Gordons Markets case answered the question of whether the 
failure to hire employees from the alleged predecessor always dooms a successor 
rights claim.90 In that case the court held that failure to hire is not determinative. 
Once that question was answered, it was open to unions to make claims in cases 
where some other element of the business was transferred, but not the employees. 
In those cases as well, the employer could raise the question of whether the 
particular elements should systematically be considered insufficient. For instance, 
in Accomodex it was argued that a mere transfer of assets, combined with a hiatus 
between the operation of the two businesses, should be held insufficient. Likewise, 
in Ivanhoe the question was whether a “right to operate” (defined in relation to 
a specific location and specific tasks) that is “retroceded” by a subcontracting 
89. Shrubsall, supra note 31 at 89-91.
90. Supra note 53.
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employer originally bound by the certification can be sufficient as per the 
instrumental approach, even where the employees are not transferred. Finally, 
in Ajax the issue was whether a unilateral decision to hire employees can ever be a 
sufficient “nexus,” and whether employees alone can ever be sufficiently important 
elements of the business to warrant a finding of successorship. In deciding these 
matters, adjudicators cannot merely “apply” the instrumental approach, as the 
questions go beyond what was settled in Metro-Parking and Bibeault, i.e., the mere 
rejection of a test that hinges on similarity of functions. This is not to say that 
these legal issues are wholly independent of the initial choice of an instrumental 
approach. In Part IV I will outline how policy arguments invoked in favour of 
and against the instrumental approach have been subsequently raised in favour 
of various rules addressing what the instrumental approach entails (this is what 
I will call “nesting”). Nevertheless, none of the cases in my diagram turned only 
on how to “apply” the instrumental approach to the facts; instead, each of them 
saw the adjudicator weigh general policy arguments that resonate with the other 
cases involving successor rights and rule more definitively on the sufficiency of a 
given factual element.
My second claim is that the cases in Figure 1 all involved choices that are 
best characterized as questions of law, not as rule application (or “questions of 
mixed law and fact”).91 Indeed, these cases all turned on the question of whether 
certain specific characteristics can suffice to constitute a sale of business as per 
the instrumental approach. Although the adjudicators had to apply whatever 
test they devised to the facts of the case at hand, the disagreement was over 
the definition of the legal test and specifically whether that test should a priori 
exclude some elements as insufficient (as was done with mere continuity of work 
when the instrumental approach was adopted). As put by Justice Bastarache in 
his dissent in Ajax, one of the questions in that case was whether “commercial 
history on its own can constitute a sufficient nexus.”92 Likewise, Accomodex dealt 
with the claim that a hiatus is always determinative. The same goes for the other 
cases. In that sense, even after Ontario and Quebec courts definitively chose the 
instrumental approach (in Metro-Parking and Bibeault, respectively), questions 
remained unanswered as to what this entailed as a matter of law. Seeing those 
cases as involving questions of law is an important step towards breaking with the 
old legality’s view of labour adjudication as the ad-hoc and contextual application 
91. Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) v Southam Inc, [1997] 1 SCR 748 at para 35, 
144 DLR (4th), Iacobucci J.
92. Ajax, supra note 45 at para 9 [emphasis added].
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of broad legal criteria. On my view, labour disputes are much more interrelated, 
and it is possible to map common structures of argument across series of cases.
IV. BEYOND PURPOSE AND PRAGMATISM: MAPPING THE 
POLICY LANDSCAPE
In this part, I bring the various successor rights cases together to blend the 
policy arguments they contain. But before I outline these arguments, I explain 
what I mean by “policy.” Policy is a word long used in American private law 
discourse. The following definition is largely inspired by the literature on policy 
argument in private law, which I propose to adapt to the labour law context.93 My 
discussion relies on (one might say anthropological) observations of a common 
practice, not on any theory of legal interpretation of my own. I take policy 
arguments to be arguments about the societal consequences of a given legal rule, 
as opposed to arguments based on deductive reasoning (say, from the concept of 
rights) or purposive interpretation. Thus, the classic example of policy arguments 
is what Jack Balkin calls social utility arguments, which “concern the practical 
consequences of a particular rule choice” and “are often expressed in terms of 
broad social policies that their advocates believe the law should foster.”94 There 
are also administrability arguments, which concern the framing of legal norms 
either as rigid rules or as open-ended standards, each with its own purported 
virtues and vices (e.g., certainty versus flexibility).95 Arguments based on legal 
expectations (and the extent to which a given rule responds to them) are also 
part of what I mean by policy.96 The foregoing are examples of what you might 
call consequentialist policy arguments. But policy is quite a capacious rhetorical 
repertoire, and other kinds of arguments come into play. Indeed, rights can 
sometimes intervene not as deductive arguments but as policy considerations 
to be balanced against other desiderata.97 Finally, institutional competence 
93. See all references in supra note 27.
94. Balkin, supra note 20 at 32.
95. See Pierre Schlag, “Rules and Standards” (1985) 33:2 UCLA L Rev 379 at 383.
96. On the role of expectations argument in private law, see Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Nature 
of the Common Law (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1988) at 37-42; Kennedy, 
“Semiotics,” supra note 20 at 328, 332.
97. For scholarly takes treating “rights” as just one type of policy to be balanced against other 
utilitarian considerations, see Donald Reagan, “Glosses on Dworkin: Rights, Principles, 
and Policies” (1978) 76:8 Mich L Rev 1213 at 1232; Kent Greenawalt, “Policy, Rights and 
Judicial Decision” (1977) 11:5 Ga L Rev 991 at 1004; David Lyons, “Justifications and 
Judicial Responsibility” (1984) 72:2 Calif L Rev 178 at 188-89.
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arguments concerning the separation of powers between courts and legislatures 
(say, the extent to which a given rule requires courts to enter legislative terrain) 
are sometimes invoked in the same fashion.98
Of course, purposive arguments are still recurrent in labour law and appear 
alongside policy arguments. It is just that they are only rarely (if ever) conclusive. 
Indeed, there can be significant disagreement as to what rules to deduce from 
the purpose. Thus, rather than being determinative, purposive arguments are 
often balanced against competing considerations, or even against competing 
interpretations of the purpose. For instance, it often does not amount to much 
to argue that a given successor rights rule gives effect to the purpose of protecting 
bargaining rights, because the opponent can answer that the legal rule amounts to 
extending, not protecting, existing bargaining rights. In other words, purposive 
argument itself becomes a terrain of struggle, which can open the door to other 
conflicting policy considerations.
I now turn to the arguments relied on by the decision makers in the cases. 
I regroup them according to whether they justify “broader” or “narrower” successor 
rights rules and present them in Tables 1 and 2. The instrumental approach itself 
is an example of a narrower rule in that it is more restrictive than the alternative 
functional approach, which is based on the sufficiency of similarity of jobs. The 
proposition that unilateral hiring of employees can be sufficient and the theory 
of retrocession are examples of broader rules, as they lead to more transfers of 
bargaining rights than their alternatives, i.e., that unilateral hiring and retroceded 
contracts are always insufficient. My basic idea is that while each of the arguments 
was formulated with respect to the particular question at hand, it can also be 
invoked to support other legal rules that are on the same side (i.e., favouring 
narrower or broader interpretations). This means that, for example, arguments 
invoked in favour of a rule that unilateral hiring never creates a sufficient nexus 
could be invoked against the theory of retrocession. This is an application of 
the idea of “nesting.” Duncan Kennedy describes this phenomenon, taking the 
tort law example of deciding whether to allow a defence of mistake in certain 
circumstances and, supposing such a defence is allowed, subsequently deciding 
whether to apply an objective standard to the mistake:
98. This theme of argument was the historical product of the influence of “process” theories 
of law like those of Lon Fuller, Henry Hart, and Albert Sacks, who were preoccupied with 
finding the most appropriate forum for a given legal decision. See Gary Peller, “Neutral 
Principles in the 1950’s” (1988) 21:4 U Mich JL Ref 561 at 566-72. For an application of 
the institutional competence policy theme in private law, see Melvin Aron Eisenberg, “The 
Responsive Model of Contract Law” (1984) 36:5 Stan L Rev 1107 at 1117-27.
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‘Nesting’ is my name for the reproduction, within a doctrinal solution to a problem, 
of the policy conflict the solution was supposed to settle. […] ‘Nesting’ is the 
reappearance of the inventory when we have to resolve gaps, conflicts or ambiguities 
that emerge when we try to put our initial solution to a doctrinal problem into 
practice. In this case, we first deploy the pro and con argument-bites in deciding 
whether or not to permit a defence of mistake. We then redeploy them in order to 
decide whether to require that the mistake be made reasonable.99
The idea is that arguments can be transferred from one question to the 
next indefinitely. This does not mean that differences, both geographic and 
temporal, do not matter when analyzing cases from different jurisdictions and 
periods. For example, there might be differences in the applicable legislative 
wording, both over time and between jurisdictions, that complicate the kind of 
analysis I propose. But this is not a problem for the six cases I analyze here. The 
Ontario and Quebec legislation, for all intents and purposes, did not change 
throughout the time periods covered by my cases.100 That said, there are some 
slight differences between Ontario and Quebec successor rights law, including 
the fact that the Quebec provision extends not only to sales of business but also 
to cases where a business is “operated by another.”101 This difference is of little 
consequence, however, as all my cases deal with fact patterns that fall under both 
provisions.102 But even if there were such differences between the cases, they 
would not invalidate or prevent the kind of structural analysis of legal argument I 
am proposing here. All the questions I map in Figure 1 had to be settled judicially 
99. Kennedy, “Semiotics,” supra note 20 at 344, 346.
100. This can be confirmed by a quick glance at the provisions transcribed in the decisions I 
analyze. In the case of Ontario, my four cases were not affected by the 1993 amendments to 
the Labour Relations Act that provided for successor rights protection for retendered service 
contracts nor by the 1995 amendments that repealed those provisions and took Crown 
employees outside the scope of successor rights provisions to facilitate privatization. For 
an overview of those contradictory amendments, see Harish C Jain & S Muthu, “Ontario 
Labour Law Reforms: A Comparative Study of Bill 40 and Bill 7” (1996) 4 CLELJ 311 
at 323-25. The reason the Ontario cases are not affected is that the only case potentially 
subject to those provisions, Ajax, involved neither service contracts nor Crown employees. 
In the case of Quebec, though the cases analyzed here are not touched by any legislative 
amendment, the successor rights provision was amended shortly after the Supreme Court 
rendered its Ivanhoe ruling. For thoughts on how the jurisprudential debates I analyze here 
could be extended into this new legislative context, see supra note 87.
101. See supra note 70.
102. For an example of a fact pattern where this distinction would make a difference, we can think 
of a receiver operating a business as part of a receivership regime, which would likely be 
captured by the Quebec but not the Ontario successorship provision. See, Adams, supra note 
11 at para 8.54, giving the example of St-Louis Redding Co. (Re) (1982), 42 CBR (N.S.) 75 
(Qc Lab Com’r).
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and were thus not conclusively answered by the legislative wording in force (nor, 
I would add, by the applicable precedents). My point is precisely that even for 
cases dealing with distinct questions in different legislative and jurisprudential 
contexts (and in two provinces), it is still possible to extract a common pattern 
of policy arguments that are interchangeable across all the different questions 
(provided the questions are sufficiently related to be “nested”). It is this common 
structure of argument, rather than details of the jurisprudential and legislative 
background, that I propose be relentlessly tracked both to get a better sense of 
possible argumentative strategies and to map the unresolved normative conflicts 
at the heart of the labour law regime.
I have grouped the arguments in fourteen pairs: in seven pairs, the initiative 
comes from the party advocating broader successorship rules (the union); in the 
other seven the initiative comes from the party advocating narrower rules (the 
employer).103 However, my configuration is not the only one possible; far from 
it. Many arguments could respond to more than one opposing claim. Moreover, 
these arguments could be persuasive on their own. Thus, my list is better seen as 
a group of 28 individual policy arguments than as a list of fixed pairs.
104105
TABLE 1: UNION-INITIATED ARGUMENT PAIRS
Arguments for a Broader Interpretation of 
Successor Rights Provisions
Arguments for a Narrower Interpretation of 
Successor Rights Provisions
1a. The broader rule is appropriate because 
it gives effect to the remedial purpose of 
successor rights provisions.104
1b. The broader rule is inappropriate because it 
defeats the legislative intent by expanding instead 
of merely protecting bargaining rights.105
103. By “initiative,” I do not refer to who initiates the procedures. For obvious reasons, unions 
are almost always the ones bringing successorship claims following an employer’s business 
decision. Rather, I refer to a chronological order, i.e., who voices the first argument and who 
responds. This is a heuristic move meant to better illustrate the fact that the second argument 
of a pair is often a response to the first one.
104. Metro-Parking, supra note 34 at para 27; Ivanhoe, supra note 12 at para 94, quoting Ajax, 
ONCA, supra note 64 at para 24.
105. Accomodex, supra note 37 at para 64.
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2a. The narrower rule marking certain 
elements as fatal to a successorship claim 
amounts to reading in restrictions on the scope 
of successor rights provisions and subverting 
legislative intent.106
2b. The narrower rule marking certain 
elements as fatal to a successorship claim is 
not excluded by the wording of successor 
rights provisions and may thus be implied by 
purposive interpretation.107
3a. The broader rule responds to employees’ 
legitimate expectation that their bargaining 
rights will not be nullified because of 
commercial activities.108
3b. It is unreasonable to expect a broader rule 
that protects jobs instead of merely protecting 
bargaining rights, because that exceeds the 
purpose of successor rights provisions.109
4a. A stringent standard for successorship in 
subcontracting creates inequality between 
employees working in core sectors of the 
business and employees working in peripheral 
sectors, the transfer of which will not give 
rise to a finding of successorship under a 
narrower rule.110
4b. Unions can minimize the damage done 
by the narrower rule by seeking region-wide 
instead of single workplace bargaining units in 
a subcontracted part of a business.111
5a. The broader rule pays special attention 
to continued employment and similarity of 
functions, and rightly so, because the relevance 
of the business to the employees is based on 
the work it provides.112
5b. The broader rule attaches too much 
importance to work as a determinative element 
of the business and unduly grants unions 
an “absolute right of property in the work 
performed by [their] members.”113
106. Ajax, Div Ct, supra note 63 at para 28, citing UFCW v Parnell Foods Ltd, [1992] OLRB Rep 
1164 at para 91, 17 CLRBR.
107. Bibeault, supra note 16 at para 160-62.
108. Ajax, Div Ct, supra note 63 at para 21, citing Lester (WW) (1978) Ltd v United Association of 
Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry, Local 740, [1990] 3 SCR 
644 at 409, 76 DLR (4th) 389; Metro-Parking, supra note 34 at para 20.
109. Canada Post Corporation and Nieman’s Pharmacy v Canadian Union of Postal Workers 
(1989), 4 CLRBR (2d) 161 at para 52, 1989 CarswellNat 854 (WLNext Can) [Nieman’s 
Pharmacy]. I have not summarized the Nieman’s case above for brevity’s sake, but I include 
it here because it contains arguments that can be transposed to other legal questions and fit 
well in my table. This case dealt with the transfer of some postal business by Canada Post to 
a pharmacy and involved the legal question of whether good faith subcontracting can ever 
trigger successor rights provisions.
110. Ivanhoe inc c Travailleurs & travailleuses unis de l’alimentation & du commerce, section 
500, [1999] RJQ 32 at para 138, 1998 CarswellQue 4709 (WLNext Can) (QCCA) LeBel J 
[Ivanhoe, QCCA].
111. Bibeault, supra note 16 at para 222.
112. Accomodex, supra note 37 at para 59.
113. Metro-Parking, supra note 34 at para 36, citing British American Bank Note Co Ltd, [1979] 
OLRB Rep Feb 72.
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6a. The narrower rule put forward by 
management is bad for employers, because 
the elimination of bargaining rights provokes 
new organizing campaigns and potential 
labour conflicts.114
6b. The broader rule put forward by the 
union, in turn, hurts the employees by 
unduly extending bargaining rights and 
circumventing the certification process, thus 
preventing employees from expressing their 
wishes in a vote.115
7a. The broader rule accounts for the fact that 
the mischief addressed by successor rights 
(the undermining of bargaining rights) is 
present even when there is no strong “nexus” 
or “legal relation”.116
7b. The broader rule wrongly allows succes-
sorship findings to be made in the absence of 
a strong “nexus” or “legal relation” between 
alleged successors. Thus, under the broader 
rule, routine commercial activities such as 
losing a contract to a competitor might lead to 
an undue finding of successorship.117
114115116117118119120121122123
TABLE 2: EMPLOYER-INITIATED ARGUMENT PAIRS
Arguments for a Narrower Interpretation of 
Successor Rights Provisions
Arguments for a Broader Interpretation of 
Successor Rights Provisions
8a. The broader rule goes against the 
legislative intention that certification attach 
to a single employer.118
8b. On the contrary, the broader rule accounts 
for the fact that the legislature intended that 
the instrumental test be adapted to “the reality 
of the business practices it is addressing.” 119
9a. The narrower rule preserves the employer’s 
“legal freedom to dispose of its business.” 120
9b. The narrower rule does not account 
for the fact that, in light of the purpose of 
successorship provisions, “[o]ne should not 
expect commercial law considerations to be 
paramount”121 in the interpretation of  
the provisions.
10a. The broader rule leads to  
unpredictable results, creating legal  
(and economic) uncertainty.122
10b. On the contrary, the broader rule 
contributes to legal (and economic) certainty 
by ensuring the “stability of certifications.”123
114. Bibeault, supra note 16 at para 146; Metro-Parking, supra note 34 at para 46.
115. Nieman’s Pharmacy, supra note 109 at para 37.
116. Metro-Parking, supra note 34 at para 46.
117. Ibid at para 36, citing NABET v Radio CYJC Ltd et al (1978) 1 CLRBR 565 [NABET]. 
118. Bibeault, supra note 16 at paras 159-62.
119. Ivanhoe, supra note 12 at para 92.
120. Metro-Parking, supra note 34 at para 20.
121. Accomodex, supra note 37 at para 52.
122. Bibeault, supra note 16 at para 218.
123. Ivanhoe, QCCA, supra note 110 at para 186.
  
  
  
  
  Bibeault, supra note 16 at paras 159-62.
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11a. The broader rule is overbroad and leads 
to unwarranted findings of successorship in 
situations where there is no continuity of  
the business.124
11b. On the contrary, the broader rule is 
“flexible” and allows for consideration of the 
facts of each given case.125
12a. The broader rule extends successor 
rights to cases where it would be unfair or 
unpractical to transfer the collective agreement 
as well as the certification. Thus it extends 
beyond ‘real’ cases of successorship.126
12b. Courts always struggle with the transfer 
or modification of an existing collective 
agreement when making a finding of  
successorship; the broader rule is not unique 
in this regard.127
13a. The broader rule creates a perverse 
incentive not to engage in a given economic 
activity (e.g., hiring employees or buying assets 
from the alleged predecessor) in order to avoid 
the application of successor rights provisions.128
13b. The narrower rule encourages employer 
schemes to undermine bargaining rights.129
14a. Relaxing the standard for the transfer 
of “part of a business” (i.e., subcontracting) 
does not account for the complexity and 
interdependence of all the components of the 
business, which cannot easily be separated.130
14b. The scope of successor rights should 
be broadened to account for new economic 
realities (corporate restructuring, flexible forms 
of production, et cetera).131
124125126127128129130131
These tables are meant to make apparent the potential interchangeability of 
policy arguments across many sub-questions. For a given choice between broader 
and narrower rules, for instance between accepting and rejecting the theory of 
retrocession, decision makers could rely on all the arguments presented above. 
Thus, they could hold that the theory of retrocession should be rejected because it 
leads to legal uncertainty (argument 10a), is overbroad (argument 11a), does not 
account for the interdependence of the various parts of the business (argument 
14a), et cetera. And these arguments could be met with their opposites, i.e., that 
a broader rule such as the theory of retrocession contributes to legal certainty 
and the stability of certifications (argument 10b), is flexible (argument 11b) and 
accounts for the realities of the new economy (argument 14b).
124. Bibeault, supra note 16 at para 166.
125. Ivanhoe, supra note 12 at para 94.
126. Ibid at para 159 (Bastarache J, dissenting).
127. Ibid at para 11 (Arbour J, for the majority).
128. Metro-Parking, supra note 34 at para 36, quoting NABET, supra note 117.
129. Ivanhoe, QCCA, supra note 110 at para 186.
130. Nieman’s Pharmacy, supra note 109 at para 41.
131. Ajax, OLRB, supra note 38 at paras 31-33; Accomodex, supra note 37 at para 75.
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The tables also reveal that purposive arguments are susceptible to many 
conflicting interpretations that undermine their claim to conclusiveness. 
As mentioned earlier, the purpose of “protecting bargaining rights” (argument 
1a) can be met with the response that the relevant rule “expands rather than 
protects” these rights (argument 1b). As evidenced by the arguments 2a and 
2b, purposive arguments related to institutional competence and the separation 
of powers are often no more conclusive. Claims that adopting a restrictive rule 
amounts to judicially rewriting the legislation (argument 2a) can be met with 
the contrary argument that a broad reading of the provision also amounts to 
judicial usurpation of the legislative role (argument 2b). Likewise, the claim that 
the legislature intended to attach bargaining rights to one employer (argument 
8a) can be met with the claim that the legislature also intended that the concept 
of “employer” be contextualized in light of the facts of each case and economic 
context (argument 8b); to which one can answer that the facts of the case are 
clear as to who is the one employer to which bargaining rights should attach, 
et cetera. It seems that purposive arguments are unlikely to be conclusive on 
their own. Instead, they will probably be accompanied by a balancing of other 
policy arguments pertaining to the separation of powers, the expectations and 
legal rights of the parties, the effects of the proposed rule on economic activity 
or legal certainty.
My analysis of successor rights cases is meant to suggest deep normative 
conflicts and legal indeterminacy (in the sense of there being no ‘right answer’). 
However, I have proposed a relentlessly practical account of legal indeterminacy 
and do not intend to offer much theorizing on the subject, except to say the 
following. I do not claim that law is always indeterminate but rather that 
incommensurable normative conflicts are created by the actors’ legal work.132 
In other words, indeterminacy can be created by the finding of a contrary 
argument that perfectly neutralizes another one. But of course sometimes law 
is determinate in the sense that one (policy) argument is more convincing 
because no actor marshals another equally convincing argument. It is just that 
whether this will happen seems wildly unpredictable, making indeterminacy 
an ever-present possibility. In a given situation, the parties’ (or the judge’s) 
132. For the inspiration of this approach, see Mark Tushnet, “Defending The Indeterminacy 
Thesis” (1996) 16:3 Quinnipiac L Rev 339 at 347; Duncan Kennedy, “A Left/
Phenomenological Alternative to the Hart/Kelsen Theory of Legal Interpretation” in Legal 
Reasoning, Collected Essays (Aurora, CO: The Davies Group, 2008) 154 at 154-57 [Kennedy, 
“Left/Phenomenological”]; Joseph William Singer, “The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and 
Legal Theory” (1984) 94:1 Yale LJ 1 at 21-22.
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efforts may produce one right answer, or they may not. This phenomenological 
approach to indeterminacy focuses not on the immutable nature of law but on 
actors’ experience of it as the “reality” to be studied.133 Hence, one could see my 
analysis above as itself creating indeterminacy and demonstrating the possibility 
thereof, by systematically pairing up arguments that neutralize each other (just 
as Llewellyn famously did with the canons of statutory interpretation).134 This is 
enough to flesh out my claim that the cases I explored evidence deep, potentially 
intractable normative conflicts.
I do want to stress again that the approach to labour law doctrine I have 
exemplified here is not based on a representative sample of cases. That is, I do not 
claim to have assembled a sample of cases that share characteristics that are 
generalizable to all of union successor rights law, let alone to labour law as a 
whole. Such a claim would in my view be untenable. For example, my analysis 
would not be more representative of Canadian successor rights law even if I had 
chosen, say, twelve cases instead of six, cases from four provinces instead of two, 
or cases that cover a shorter time period. It seems to me that one can never claim 
to have amassed a sample of cases representative of all those that are out there. 
Rather than an empirical demonstration in the strict sense, I have sought to 
provide an illustration of the way in which a small group of cases can be arranged 
doctrinally so as to make apparent (or, to put it in more phenomenological terms, 
to create) incommensurable conflicts of legal argument. I do think that my 
arranging of the cases in a pyramidal form of sub-questions dealing with the legal 
sufficiency of certain elements illustrates how this analysis can be applied to any 
successor rights case dealing with whether there is a “sale of business” in a given 
instance. The whole point of my reframing of case-by-case rule applications as 
logically and chronologically interrelated questions of law is to suggest that such 
an extension is possible. However, this is the most I can achieve given my space 
constraints, and by necessity my analysis falls short of an empirical demonstration 
based on a scientifically sound sample of cases. Instead, the reader should see my 
analysis as an illustration of what can be achieved when we abandon the old 
legality approach and look for intractable policy conflicts in labour law, and as an 
invitation to incorporate this method in teaching and doctrinal research.
On a related note, I have to leave for later exploration the suggestion that this 
framework could be extended to other labour law questions such as the elements 
required to make out just cause for dismissal, legitimate business reason for a layoff, 
133. For the most elaborate and best known discussion of indeterminacy in phenomenological 
terms, see Kennedy, “Left/Phenomenological,” supra note 132.
134. Llewellyn, supra note 20.
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European-style proportionality of strike action and constitutional protection of 
strikes depending on their objectives (“purely political” or otherwise), North 
American-style unfair labour practices and bad faith bargaining, et cetera. Suffice 
it for now to mention that I think my model, based as it is on policy argument in 
favour of narrower and broader rules on the legal sufficiency of certain elements 
under a given test, is capable of being extended to many other areas of labour and 
employment law writ large. Again, this is a call to take up this kind of analysis 
and constantly work with the hypothesis that, in labour and employment law, 
there is no single set of rules that is responsive to pragmatic and socially purposive 
reasoning, but rather a hodgepodge of unexplainable policy choices that shape 
the economy at any given point and that could easily be redesigned entirely to 
favour different policies and material interests.
V. CONCLUSION
In this article, I have analyzed a series of Canadian cases on successor rights in 
which labour adjudicators and courts have dealt with the question of whether 
bargaining rights should be transferred to another business entity in the context 
of sales, restructuring, and subcontracting. Parts I and II summarized classic 
successor rights cases from Ontario and Quebec dealing with the instrumental or 
organic approach to the meaning of “sale of a business,” according to which there 
needs to be a transfer of the business as a whole and mere similarity of functions 
does not suffice. In Part III, I argued that these cases are best understood as a series 
of interdependent legal holdings as to what elements should be per se insufficient, 
not merely as the application of the instrumental approach to a particular fact 
pattern. In Part IV I read together the arguments used to justify different legal 
holdings and demonstrated that each policy argument can be raised in many 
different cases, rendering purposive argument inconclusive. I attempted to cast 
doubt on a particular legal theory, the old legality, according to which labour 
law is made not through conventional legal reasoning but through non-legal 
and ad-hoc applications of loose legal criteria in light of purposive reasoning. 
Based on my account of conflicting legal policy arguments, I argued that the old 
legality paradigm should be abandoned in favour of an approach that embraces 
the incommensurable normative and legal conflicts that pervade the collective 
bargaining regime and the economy it structures.
One might object that the old legality is a strange target because it has, 
to some extent, been displaced as the intellectual paradigm of choice in light of 
the perceived deficiencies of the post-war labour regimes in the new economy. 
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While labour lawyers, scholars, and courts have by and large stuck to the old 
legality,135 some sophisticated labour lawyers have been busy outlining alternative 
normative frameworks, sometimes based on human rights, capabilities theory, 
or economic efficiency.136 However, many other scholarly takes on the new 
economy merely propose new modes of enforcement of labour laws while in fact 
implicitly or explicitly maintaining the old legality as the governing approach.137 
It thus seems as if the old legality will not be easily displaced and is deserving of 
critical scrutiny.
The need for critical scrutiny is reinforced by the fact that the old legality and 
its rationalization of law according to non-legal, expert perceptions of the good of 
society, in a context where the existing labour law regimes are what is rationalized, 
may well have the effect of reinforcing the status quo. It may do so by supplying 
an overarching normative justification for existing legal regimes that validates 
them and holds them to be more than they really are, i.e., ad-hoc and often 
unexplainable compromises between various conflicting policies, and ultimately 
between various material interests. I rely here on Hans Kelsen’s analysis of the 
legitimating function of natural law, by which he also meant the “sociological 
jurisprudence”138 from which labour law’s old legality was born. For Kelsen, law 
is a positive system of coercion ordering various contradictory interests, and 
attempts to justify it by reference to any outside criterion of “justice” legitimize 
the order in place:
Seen from the standpoint of rational cognition, there are only interests and thus 
conflicts of interests, which are resolved by way of an ordering of interests that either 
satisfies the one at the expense of the other, or establishes a balance, a compromise 
between the opposing interests. That only one ordering of interests has absolute 
value (which really means, ‘is just’) cannot be accounted for by way of rational 
cognition. … Only positive law is given to cognition. … The less one strives to 
separate clearly the positive law from justice, and the more indulgent one is toward 
the lawmaker’s efforts to have the law also accepted somehow as just, the more one lends 
support to the ideological bias that is characteristic of classical, conservative natural law 
theory. What matters there is less the cognition of prevailing law than a justification 
of it, a transfiguration, achieved by showing that the positive law is simply the 
emanation of a natural or divine order or of a system of reason – the emanation of 
an absolutely ‘right’, just order.139
135. See supra notes 11-18.
136. See generally, supra notes 25-27.
137. Supra note 24.
138. Hans Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934; 
1992) at 41 [Kelsen].
139. Ibid at 17-18 [emphasis added].
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I should mention that, like Kelsen’s view (and that of many critical legal 
theorists),140 my view of sociological jurisprudence as legitimizing the status quo 
by rationalizing the positive law depends on the claim that said positive law is 
not amenable to rationalization because of incommensurable conflicts between 
“a number of decisions … of equal standing” on each legal question (hence my 
emphasis on indeterminacy).141 In short, it is because the status quo does not rest 
on logical closure or coherence that the old legality’s rationalization legitimizes it. 
It seems very plausible that this rationalization would have a moderating effect on 
the law reform avenues we think are possible and worth pursuing.
In the context of the rolling back of the post-war labour law regimes (often 
under crisis-induced austerity), preserving the status quo and being “indulgent… 
toward the lawmaker’s efforts”142 might be thought to be a good thing. But I 
think on balance such a rationalization through the old legality paradigm does 
more harm than good. In recent decades, inspiring research has shown that the 
post-war North American labour law model and its core collective bargaining 
component offer very partial protection that is often structurally skewed in 
favour of certain interests at the expense of others. Particularly, scholars have 
underlined the post-war regime’s shortcomings with respect to women,143 
140. See the following analyses of the legitimating effect of denying intractable normative conflicts 
and legal indeterminacy: Alan Freeman, “Legitimizing Racial Discrimination through 
Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine” (1978) 62:6 Minn 
L Rev 1049; Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, “Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical 
Legal Theory and the Practice of Law” (1982-83) 11:3 NYU Rev L & Soc Change 369; 
Gerald Frug, “The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law” (1984) 97:6 Harv L Rev 1276; 
Robert W Gordon, “Some Critical Theories of Law and Their Critics” in David Kairys, 
ed, The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique, 3d ed (New York: Basic Books, 1998) 641 at 
647-51; Duncan Kennedy, “The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries” (1979) 28:2 Buff 
L Rev 205 at 217-18.
141. Kelsen, supra note 138 at 80.
142. Ibid at 18.
143. See Judy Fudge, “Reconceiving Employment Standards Legislation: Labour Law’s Little 
Sister and the Feminization of Labour” (1991) 7:1 J L & Soc Pol’y 73 at 87-88; Joanna 
Conaghan & Kerry Rittich, “Introduction: Interrogating the Work/Family Divide” in Joanne 
Conaghan & Kerry Rittich, eds, Labour Law, Work, and Family (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005) 1.
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ethnic minorities,144 self-employed persons145 and a whole host of sectors of 
the economy not amenable to unionization under such a local bargaining unit 
model.146 European labour law systems also have their own inadequacies.147 These 
shortcomings are exacerbated when Northern labour law regimes are transposed 
in the Global South.148 Not to mention of course that the new economy has 
greatly diminished the post-war model’s efficacy (and eradicated it in the United 
States). Further, one could argue that model never went far enough in the 
direction of wealth redistribution anyway.149 In this context, it seems useful to 
underline the analytical contestability of the old legality on which these regimes 
rest, if only to open up the possibility for more ambitious re-regulation of work 
in all its forms, perhaps by tackling all the legal regimes that determine living 
conditions beyond labour law as traditionally conceived.150 Of course, once one 
lets go of the pragmatic and purposive defense of existing regimes in the name of 
social stability and industrial peace, other normative projects such as economic 
efficiency might rear their heads to replace it.151 This prospect requires one to 
144. See Colleen Sheppard, “Mapping anti-discrimination law onto inequality at work: 
Expanding the meaning of equality in international labour law” (2012) 151:1-2 Int’l Lab Rev 
1; Adelle Blackett, “Situated reflections on international labour law, capabilities, and decent 
work: The case of Centre Maraîcher Eugène Guinois,” Liber Amicorum in honour of Katia 
Boustany (2007) hors série RQDI 223.
145. See Judy Fudge, Eric Tucker & Leah Vosko, “Changing Boundaries in Employment: 
Developing a New Platform for Labour Law” (2003) 10 CLELJ 329 at 331-32; Brian A 
Langille & Guy Davidov, “Beyond Employees and Independent Contractors: A View from 
Canada” (1999) 21 Comp Lab L & Pol’y J 7 at 16-17 [Langille & Davidov].
146. Langille & Davidov,ibid; Adelle Blackett & Colleen Sheppard, “Collective Bargaining and 
Equality: Making Connections” (2003) 142:4 Int’l Lab Rev 419 at 422-27.
147. See Diamond Ashiagbor, “Unravelling the Embedded Liberal Bargain: Labour and Social 
Welfare Law in the Context of EU Market Integration” (2013) 19:3 Eur LJ 303 at 308-10; 
David M Trubek & James S Mosher, “New Governance, Employment Policy, and the 
European Social Model” in Jonathan Zeitlin & David M Trubek, eds, Governing Work 
and Welfare in a New Economy: European and American Experiments (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2003) 33 at 35.
148. See Adelle Blackett, “Beyond Standard Setting: A Study of ILO Technical Cooperation 
on Regional Labor Law Reform in West and Central Africa” (2011) 32 Comp Lab L & 
Pol’y J 443 at 461-64; Alvaro Santos, “Labor Flexibility, Legal Reform, and Economic 
Development” (2009) 50 Va J Intl L 43 at 68-73 [Santos]; see generally Tzehainesh Teklé, 
Labour Law and Worker Protection in Developing Countries (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010).
149. Klare, supra note 10.
150. See Kerry Rittich, “Fragmented Work and Multi-level Labour Market Governance: 
Informality, Crisis Policy and an Expanded ‘Law of Work’” in de Búrca, Kilpatrick & Scott, 
supra note 24 at 185.
151. See the work cited in supra note 27.
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seriously address these projects and the extent to which they might put a brake on 
redistributive projects, an endeavor for which there already exists a solid repertoire 
of critical legal analyses (hint: I think economy efficiency concerns are sometimes 
legitimate but very often overblown).152 However, such an intellectual adventure 
seems well worth the risk if, in this new economy, we are to have a legality that 
can carry forward our wildest longings for redistribution and solidarity.
152. See generally Santos, supra note 148; Duncan Kennedy, “Cost-Benefit Analysis of 
Entitlement Problems: A Critique” 33:3 Stan L Rev 387 (1981); Nicholas Mercuro & Steven 
G Medema, Economics and the Law: From Posner to Post-Modernism (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1997); Kerry Rittich, Recharacterizing Restructuring: Law, Distribution and 
Gender in Market Reform (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002).
